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Abstract 
 
Do “Anglo-Saxon” management practices generate higher productivity only at the expense of lousy 
work-life balance (WLB) for workers? Many critics of “neo-libéralisme sauvage” have argued that 
increased competition from globalisation is damaging employees’ quality of life. Others have argued 
the opposite that improving work-life balance is actually a competitive tool that companies can use 
to raise productivity. We try to shed some empirical light on these issues using an innovative survey 
tool to collect new data on management and work-life balance practices from 732 medium sized 
manufacturing firms in the US, France, Germany and the UK. First, we show that our measure of 
work-life balance is a useful summary of a range of policies in the firm – family-friendly policies, 
flexible working, shorter hours, more holidays, subsidised childcare, etc. We show that this work-
life balance measure is significantly associated with better management. Firms in environments that 
are more competitive and/or who are more productive, however, do not have significantly worse 
work-life balance for their workers. These findings are inconsistent with the view that competition, 
globalisation and “Anglo-Saxon” management practices are intrinsically bad for the work-life 
balance of workers. On the other hand, neither are these findings supportive of the optimistic “win-
win” view that work-life balance improves productivity in its own right. Rather we find support for a 
“hybrid” theory that work-life balance is a choice for managers that is compatible with low or high 
productivity.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
As unemployment in the UK has fallen to historically low levels, policy and media attention has 
focused more on the quality of work rather than just the quantity of jobs. This focus has sharpened 
as female workforce participation has steadily increased and issues of work-life balance (WLB) and 
family-friendly policies have risen up on the political agenda. Many of these debates have focused 
around the important issue of equity at work. However, what are the economic effects of changing 
WLB practices and how do they relate to firm productivity and management more generally?  
  
To dig deeper into this puzzle we crudely characterise two opposing views on WLB-enhancing 
practices – the “Chirac” theory and the “win-win” theory. The Chirac theory argues that Anglo-
Saxon “neo-liberalism” encapsulated by tougher product market competition and globalisation has 
undesirable consequences. Although these forces will raise productivity, they come at the expense of 
misery for workers in the form of poor WLB (long hours, job insecurity, intense and unsatisfying 
work). The win-win theory in contrast argues that better WLB will improve productivity; and 
employers are making the mistake of failing to treat their workers as assets by implementing better 
WLB policies. The present UK government is closer to the win-win view and has introduced more 
generous provisions for maternity and paternity leave, for example.  
  
In our study, we find evidence for a hybrid view between these two polar extremes. Using originally 
collected data on WLB measures and management practices on over 700 firms in Europe and the 
US, we first find that the Chirac hypothesis is not supported by the data – there is a positive 
association between overall management quality and work-life balance. That is, better-managed 
firms provide a better WLB for their employees. Similarly, the hypothesis that competition and 
globalisation are bad for workers’ WLB also receives little support: There is no relationship between 
competition and work-life balance. In addition, larger firms – which are typically more globalised – 
typically have better WLB practices. 
  
However, the win-win view that WLB will improve productivity also received little empirical 
support: there is no systematic relationship between productivity and WLB once good management 
is accounted for. 
  
We consequently find some support for the third “hybrid” theory where “good management” and 
work-life balance are neither straightforward substitutes for each other nor strictly complementary. 
If firms do introduce better WLB this neither penalises them in terms of productivity (as suggested 
by the Chirac theory), nor does it significantly reward them (as claimed by the win-win view). On 
average, they are neutral.  
 
This may suggest that improving WLB is socially desirable – workers obviously like it and firm 
productivity does not suffer. However, our results do not give a green light for policy-makers to 
regulate more WLB. Even if productivity does not fall, WLB is costly to implement and maintain, 
and may result in significantly lower profitability. Any proposed changes to WLB policies need to 
take these additional costs on firms into account.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Does “good management”1 and higher productivity come at the expense of work-life balance 
(WLB), or is good work-life balance an important component of the management of successful 
firms?  
Proponents of the “European social model” often support the first view, that unregulated firms will 
sacrifice workers’ wellbeing in response to increasing globalisation and tougher competition. This 
view is reflected in statements by European politicians who see their social model under threat in the 
face of increased competition from within and outside the EU. For example, Gerhard Schröder, the 
former German Chancellor, stated that: 
“Preserving social cohesion is also a European task, since people frequently see a unified 
European market […] as a Trojan Horse of increasing competition dissolving […] societal 
ties that are indispensable for productive coexistence.”2
 
Similarly, Jacques Chirac, the French president, stressed that: 
“[Europe’s] model is the social market economy, [the] alliance of liberty and solidarity, 
with the public authority safeguarding the public interest. […] France will therefore never 
let Europe become a mere free-trade area. We want a political and social Europe rooted in 
solidarity.”3
Conversely, a more optimistic “win-win” view is often justified by citing the tangible and intangible 
business benefits of good WLB.4 Tony Blair, the UK Prime minister, for example stated:  
“The UK has shown it is possible to have flexible labour markets combined with […] family 
friendly policies to help work/life balance […]. The result has been higher growth, higher 
employment and low unemployment.”5
Given the inability of Continental Europe to match US productivity growth and labour market 
performance since the mid-1990s6 the question of the trade-off between job quality and competition 
has featured prominently when discussing reform strategies (e.g. around the Lisbon Agenda). There 
                                                 
1 We will explain in detail below how we empirically measure good managerial quality as a combination of best 
practices based on shopfloor operations, targets, monitoring and people management. These tend to have an “Anglo-
Saxon” flavour, but we will show they are key to better firm performance. 
2 Gerhard Schröder, “Auf die Kleinen ist Verlass”, Die Zeit, 20/10/2005  
(http://www.zeit.de/2005/43/ZukunftEuropa?page=all). 
3 Euractiv, “Blair, Chirac in drive to win citizens’ support”, 27/10/2005  
(http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-146484-16&type=News). 
4See, for example, Employers for Work-Life Balance 
(http://www.employersforwork-lifebalance.org.uk/work/benefits.htm).  
5 Toby Helm and David Rennie, “Blair attack on “out-of-date” Chirac”, Daily Telegraph, 25/03/2005 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/03/25/weu25.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/03/25/ixnewstop.
html). 
6 See, for example, http://cep.lse.ac.uk/textonly/people/vanreenen/papers/productivity_mindthegap.pdf. 
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is a fear that market-oriented reforms may help productivity growth, but will undermine the work-
life balance of employees. 
Recent policy debates on European and national level have focused on issues surrounding or directly 
addressing issues of WLB and elements thereof. For example, the Working Time Directive has been 
under intense discussion recently, with several governments in Continental Europe challenging 
Britain’s’ right to opt-out of the maximum ceiling of 48 hours a week.7 In addition, the European 
Commissions’ proposed Services Directive is designed to open up the service sector of Member 
State to greater intra-EU competition in a hitherto sheltered sector. It has been stalled by opposition 
in France and Germany partly because of the claims that it will exert a heavy toll on the work-life 
balance of workers.  
 
On both sides of the argument, there seem to be underlying empirical assumptions regarding the 
interaction between productivity and WLB. Unfortunately, the current econometric evidence is still 
limited in this area.8 The question of WLB-enhancing practices, their implementation and 
effectiveness has recently been taken up by in the management literature. A crude generalisation of 
the findings would be:  
i) WLB measures have a positive effect on firm or workplace performance9 
ii) WLB measures are more effective in situations demanding high employee flexibility and 
responsiveness10  
iii) Firms with a more skilled workforce are more likely to implement WLB-enhancing 
practices11 
This leaves us with a dilemma: Policymakers are concerned that firms are failing to introduce 
sufficient measures to ensure a sensible work-life balance for their employees because the costs of 
doing this are too high in competitive global markets. On the other hand, the academic literature 
                                                 
7 David Gow, “Britain faces EU showdown over renewal of working time opt-out “, The Guardian, 08/12/2005  
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,7369,1661880,00.html). 
8 For an overview of economic statistics relating to job quality see Green (2006). 
9 Delaney and Huselid, 1996, Huselid, Jackson and Schuler, 1997, Konrad and Mangel, 2000, Perry-Smith and Blum, 
2000, Guthrie, 2001, Budd and Mumford, forthcoming, Gray, 2002. 
10 For example in high-technology industries (Arthur, 2003) or in highly differentiated firms (Lee and Miller, 1999, 
Guthrie et al., 2002, Youndt et al. 1996). 
11 Gray and Tudball (2003), Osterman (1995). The percentage of female employees has a weakly positive association 
with the implementation of WLB practices (Harel et al., 2003, Gray and Tudball, 2003, Miliken, Martins and Morgan, 
1998, Martins, Eddleston and Veiga, 2002, Perry-Smith and Blum, 2000, Guthrie and Roth, 1999). 
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seems to believe all firms should be adopting positive WLB schemes given their apparently positive 
impact of firm performance, particularly in more competitive markets (where the value of speedy 
responses is presumably high).  
 
Our study sheds light on these contrasting views using a new dataset on over 700 European and US 
firms, containing rich data on firm performance, management and WLB practices. As we show, 
many of the prior academic results disappear when controls for more general management practices 
are included in the analysis. Well-managed firms treat their employees better (higher WLB), hire 
staff that are more skilled and are highly productive. Without controls for management quality, a 
range of spurious results can therefore easily arise. In particular, the positive “effect” of WLB on 
productivity is not robust when we include a control for the overall quality of management (Bloom 
et al, 2005). We find that firms with good WLB are no more (or less) productive than those with 
poor WLB. 
 
Our results need to be interpreted carefully, of course, as they are derived from a cross section of 
data and we are not able to evaluate the implementation of a policy. Identifying the direction of the 
arrow of causality between WLB, competition and productivity is therefore hazardous. Nevertheless, 
the conditional correlations we report caution against the simplistic pessimistic and optimistic 
models of WLB commonly heard in the debate. 
In section II, we discuss our general models of management practices and firm performance. In 
section III, we provide a detailed discussion of our datasets and the procedures used to collect this. 
In section IV, we discuss our results and in section V, we provide some concluding comments. A 
detailed set of empirical appendices then follows. 
II. MODELS 
Based on the discussion above, we can characterize several “models” of WLB. Let us characterize 
two polar positions and one hybrid position. The first model we shall label (rather unfairly, given 
how crudely we will state the position) the “Chirac” theory after the current French president, and 
the second we will label the “win-win” theory. 
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The Chirac Theory 
The critique of “neo-libéralisme sauvage” runs roughly as follows. The US (and to a lesser extent 
the UK) have achieved some economic success in recent years relative to the largest Continental 
European countries (France, Germany and Italy). This, it is alleged, is due to the unleashing of 
market forces that has toughened up competition in product markets (and labour and capital markets) 
through privatisation, trade liberalisation, the removal of state subsidies for national champions, etc. 
In Britain, this began under Mrs. Thatcher and has continued under Mr. Blair. Competition has 
fostered the use of “Anglo-Saxon management practices” that has helped increase productivity, but 
it has been at the expense of the quality of workers’ lives both in the workplace and at home. Poor 
work-life balance arises from long and intense working hours with little flexibility. In short, the 
forces of globalisation that intensify competition should be resisted because better productivity 
should not come at the expense of the quality of life and social cohesion. Jacques Chirac and 
Gerhard Schröder’s quotes in the introduction concisely outline this view. 
 
Win-Win Theory 
The alternative view is far more optimistic. Improving employee work-life balance helps bolster 
morale and enables firms to retain and attract better quality workers. For example, potential 
employees with children will not supply their labour to firms with poor WLB so such companies 
will miss a pool of potential talent. Why, then, do employers not adopt these good practices? It may 
be that some firms are simply badly managed and are making mistakes – as information spreads 
about the benefits of WLB this will change (or else the firms will be driven out of business). The 
government could have a role in information provision or, more radically, in forcing employers to do 
the “right thing”. Alternatively, firms may know that improving WLB will increase productivity but 
they do not want to incur the costs of change. In other words, a firm currently running a low WLB 
strategy may not find it profitable to move to a high WLB strategy because of the costs of changing. 
Since having more WLB is good for people in general, it is then argued that the government needs to 
intervene to shift employers to a better “high WLB, high productivity” equilibrium.12  
 
 
                                                 
12 Many of these arguments mirror those in favour of unions (e.g. Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
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“Hybrid” Theory 
A third, hybrid view, steers a middle course. Competition stimulates better management and 
productivity. Good managers may also be more likely to introduce better WLB, but WLB has no 
direct effect at all on productivity. Firms introduce WLB based on the relative costs and benefits 
depending on what goods they produce and the type of workers they seek to hire. Greater 
competition has no direct effect on WLB. 
 
The flow diagram in figure 1 captures this intuition. If firms with better WLB also tend to have 
better management in general then a naïve regression of productivity on WLB would uncover a 
positive coefficient. This will be entirely spurious, however, as better productivity and WLB are due 
to the firm having higher managerial quality that is an unobserved variable. The only way to 
disentangle the relationship is to gather data on management quality in general. 
 
Competition Good Management
High Productivity
Work Life Balance
Figure 1: “Hybrid” view of Competition, Management & WLB
+
+
?
 
 
To summarize, these three models provide a set of predictions laid out in Table 1 below, which we 
will subsequently take to the data. 
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Table 1: Correlations predicted by the different theories 
 Theories 
Correlation of WLB and: Chirac Win-Win Hybrid 
Competition Negative Ambiguous Ambiguous 
Management Negative Positive Ambiguous 
Productivity Negative Positive Zero 
 
III. DATA 
III.A Scoring WLB and Management Practices 
Measuring WLB and management practices requires codifying these concepts into something widely 
applicable across different firms across the manufacturing sector. This is a hard task as WLB and 
good management are obviously tough to define. To do this we combined questions that have been 
used previously in: (i) the Workplace Employment Survey (WERS); (ii) a management practice 
evaluation tool developed by a leading international management consultancy firm; and (iii) the 
prior economics and management academic literature.  
 
Work-Life Balance 
In Appendix A2 we detail the Human Resources Interview Guide which was used to collect a range 
of detailed WLB practices and characteristics from firms. We collected three types of key data. (a) 
Workforce characteristic data on key variables including average employee age, hours, holidays and 
proportion female, plus a full set of conditioning variables on skills, training and unionization. (b) 
WLB policies data on key variables including childcare flexibility, home-working entitlements, part-
time to full-time flexibility, job-sharing schemes and childcare subsidy schemes. (c) WLB 
perceptions data on individuals’ view of their own firms WLB versus other firms in the industry. 
This will be our key WLB measure, which will be validated by showing its strongly significant links 
to both the workforce characteristics data and the WLB policies data. This question was defined as 
follows: 
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Question:  Relative to other companies in your industry how much does your 
company emphasize work-life balance? 
Response choices (scoring):  Much less (1); Slightly less (2); The same (3); Slightly more (4); Much 
more (5) 
 
In the empirical work reported, we use this as a continuous variable coded 1 through 5, but the 
results are robust to other statistical ways of treating the ordering13 (e.g. using an ordered probit 
approach instead of OLS).  
 
Management Practices 
In Appendix A1, we detail the practices and the questions in the same order as they appeared in the 
survey, describe the scoring system and provide three anonymous responses per question. These 
practices can be grouped into four areas: operations (3 practices), monitoring (5 practices), targets 
(5 practices) and incentives (5 practices). The operations management section focuses on the 
introduction of lean manufacturing techniques, the documentation of process improvements and the 
rationale behind introductions of improvements. The monitoring section focuses on the tracking of 
the performance of individuals, reviewing performance (e.g. through regular appraisals and job 
plans), and consequence management (e.g. making sure that plans are kept and appropriate sanctions 
and rewards are in place). The targets section examines the type of targets (whether goals are simply 
financial or operational or more holistic), the realism of the targets (stretching, unrealistic or non-
binding), the transparency of targets (simple or complex) and the range and interconnection of 
targets (e.g. whether they are given consistently throughout the organization). Finally, incentives (or 
people management) include promotion criteria, pay and bonuses, and fixing or firing bad 
performers, where best practice is deemed to be an approach that gives strong rewards for those with 
both ability and effort. A subset of the practices has similarities with those used in studies on HRM 
practices, such as Ichniowski, Shaw and Prenushi (1997) and Black and Lynch (2001). 
Since the scaling may vary across practices in the econometric estimation, we convert the scores 
(from the 1 to 5 scale) to z-scores by normalising each practice to mean zero and standard deviation 
                                                 
13 50% of firms reported that their WLB was average (3, the middle category). There were 4% in the bottom category (1, 
much less than average), 12% in the second category (2, slightly less than average), 26% in the fourth category (4, 
slightly more than average) and 8% in the top category (5, much more than average). The bias towards exaggerating 
one’s own WLB performance should not affect the statistical results if this measurement error is random across firms. 
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one. In our main econometric specifications, we take the unweighted average across all z-scores as 
our primary measure of overall managerial practice, but we also experiment with other weightings 
schemes based on factor analytic approaches. 
There is legitimate scope for disagreement over whether all of these measures really constitute 
“good practice”. Therefore, an important way to examine the external validity of the measures is to 
examine whether they are correlated with data on firm performance constructed from company 
accounts and the stock market.  
 
III.B Collecting Accurate Responses 
With this evaluation tool we can, in principle, provide some quantification of firms’ WLB and 
management practices. However, an important issue is the extent to which we can obtain unbiased 
responses to questions from firms. In particular, will respondents provide accurate responses? As is 
well known in the surveying literature (see, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) a 
respondent’s answer to survey questions is typically biased by the scoring grid and anchored towards 
those answers that they expect the interviewer to consider “correct”. In addition, interviewers may 
themselves have pre-conceptions about the performance of the firms they are interviewing and bias 
their scores based on their ex-ante perceptions. More generally, a range of background 
characteristics, potentially correlated with good and bad managers, may generate some kinds of 
systematic bias in the survey data. 
To try to address these issues we took a range of steps to obtain accurate data.  
First, the survey was conducted by telephone without telling the managers they were being scored.14 
This enabled scoring to be based on the interviewer’s evaluation of the actual firm practices, rather 
than the firm’s aspirations, the manager’s perceptions or the interviewer’s impressions.15 To run this 
“blind” scoring we used open questions (i.e. “can you tell me how you promote your employees”), 
rather than closed questions (i.e. “do you promote your employees on tenure [yes/no]?”). These 
questions target actual practices and examples, with the discussion continuing until the interviewer 
                                                 
14 This survey tool has been passed by Stanford’s Human Subjects Committee. The deception involved was deemed 
acceptable because it is: (i) necessary to get unbiased responses; (ii) minimised to the management practice questions 
and is temporary (we send managers debriefing packs afterwards); and (iii) presents no risk as the data is confidential. 
15 If an interviewer could not score a question, it was left blank, with the firm average taken over the remaining 
questions. The average number of un-scored questions per firm was 1.3%, with no firm included in the sample if more 
than three questions were un-scored. 
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could make an accurate assessment of the firm’s typical practices. Typically about three or four 
questions were needed to score each practice. 
Second, the interviewers did not know anything about the firm’s financial information or 
performance in advance of the interview. This was achieved by selecting medium sized 
manufacturing firms and by providing only firm names and contact details to the interviewers (but 
no financial details). These smaller firms would typically not be known by name and are rarely 
reported in the business media. The interviewers were specially trained graduate students from top 
European and US business schools, with a median age of twenty-eight and five years prior business 
experience in the manufacturing sector16. All interviews were conducted in the manager’s native 
language. 
Third, each interviewer ran over 50 interviews on average, allowing us to remove interviewer fixed 
effects from all empirical specifications. This helps to address concerns over inconsistent 
interpretation of categorical responses (see Manski, 2004), standardizing the scoring system. 
Fourth, the survey instrument targeted plant managers, who are typically senior enough to have an 
overview of management practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day operations of 
the enterprise.  
Fifth, a detailed set of information was also collected on the interview process itself (number and 
type of prior contacts before obtaining the interviews, duration, local time-of-day, date and day of 
the week), on the manager (gender, seniority, nationality, company and job tenure, internal and 
external employment experience, and location), and on the interviewer (we can include individual 
interviewer-fixed effects, time-of-day and a subjective reliability score assigned by the interviewer). 
Some of these survey controls are significantly informative about the management score (see Table 
C1)17, and when we use these as controls for interview noise in our econometric evaluations the 
coefficient on the management score typically increased (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2005). 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Thanks to the interview team of Johannes Banner, Michael Bevan, Mehdi Boussebaa, Dinesh Cheryan, Alberic de 
Solere, Manish Mahajan, Simone Martin, Himanshu Pande, Jayesh Patel and Marcus Thielking. 
17 In particular, we found the scores were significantly higher for senior managers, when interviews were conducted later 
in the week and/or earlier in the day. That is to say, scores were highest, on average, for senior managers on a Friday 
morning and lowest for junior managers on a Monday afternoon. By including information on these characteristics in our 
analysis, we explicitly controlled for these types of interview bias. 
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III.C Obtaining Interviews with Managers 
The interview process took about 50 minutes on average, and was run from the London School of 
Economics. Overall, we obtained a response rate of 54%, which was achieved through four steps.  
First, the interview was introduced as “a piece of work”18 without discussion of the firm’s financial 
position or its company accounts, making it relatively uncontroversial for managers to participate. 
Interviewers did not discuss financials in the interviews, both to maximize the participation of firms 
and to ensure our interviewers were truly “blind” on the firm’s financial position. 
Second, questions were ordered to lead with the least controversial (shop-floor management) and 
finish with the most controversial (pay, promotions and firings). The WLB questions were placed at 
the end of the interview to ensure the most candour in the response to this. 
Third, interviewers’ performance was monitored, as was the proportion of interviews achieved, so 
they were persistent in chasing firms (the median number of contacts each interviewer had per 
interview was 6.4). The questions are also about practices within the firm that any plant manager can 
respond to, so there are potentially several managers per firm who could be contacted19.  
Fourth, written endorsement of the Bundesbank (in Germany) and the Treasury (in the UK), and a 
scheduled presentation to the Banque de France, helped demonstrate to managers this was an 
important exercise with official support.  
 
III.D Sampling Frame and Additional Data 
Since our aim is to compare across countries we decided to focus on the manufacturing sector where 
productivity is easier to measure than in the non-manufacturing sector. We also focused on medium 
sized firms selecting a sample where employment ranged between 50 and 10,000 workers (with a 
median of 700). Very small firms have little publicly available data. Very large firms are likely to be 
more heterogeneous across plants, and it would be more difficult to get a picture of managerial 
performance in the firm as a whole from one or two plant interviews. We drew a sampling frame 
from each country to be representative of medium sized manufacturing firms and then randomly 
                                                 
18 Words like “survey” or “research” should be avoided as these are used by switchboards to block market research calls. 
19 We found no significant correlation between the number, type and time-span of contacts before an interview is 
conducted and the management score. This suggests while different managers may respond differently to the interview 
proposition this does not appear to be directly correlated with their responses or the average management practices of the 
firm. 
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chose the order in which to contact firms (see Appendix B for details). We also excluded any clients 
of our partnering consultancy firm from our sampling frame20. 
Comparing the responding firms with those in the sampling frame, we found no evidence that the 
responders were systematically different to the non-responders on any of the performance measures. 
They were also statistically similar on all the other observables in our dataset. The only exception 
was on size where our firms were slightly larger than average than those in the sampling frame. 
 
III.E Evaluating and Controlling for Potential Measurement Error  
We could have measurement error in the WLB and management practice scores obtained using our 
survey tool. To quantify this we performed repeat interviews on management practice data on 64 
firms, contacting different managers in the firm, typically at different plants, using different 
interviewers. To the extent that our measures are truly picking up general company-wide practices 
these two scores should be correlated, while to the extent that the measure is driven by noise the 
measures should be independent. 
Figure 2 plots the average firm level management scores from the first interview against the second 
interviews, from which we can see that they are highly correlated (correlation 0.734 with p-value 
0.000). Furthermore, there is no obvious (or statistically significant) relationship between the degree 
of measurement error and the absolute score. That is to say, high and low scores appear to be as well 
measured as average scores, and firms that have high (or low) scores on the first interview tend to 
have high (or low) scores on the second interview. Thus, firms that score below 2 or above 4 on the 
1-5 scale of composite management scores appear to be genuinely badly or well managed rather than 
extreme draws of sampling measurement error. 
                                                 
20 This removed 33 firms out of our sampling frame of 1,353 firms 
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Figure 2: The Management Scoring Appears Reliable 
Note: Scores from 64 repeat interviews on the same firm with different managers and different interviewers. 
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III.F Productivity and Competition Data 
Quantitative information on firm sales, employment, capital, materials etc. came from the company 
accounts and proxy statements, and is used to calculate firm level productivity. The details are 
provided in Appendix B. To measure competition we follow Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2005) 
in using three broad measures. The first measure is the degree of import penetration in the country 
by three-digit industry measured as the share of total inputs over domestic production. This is 
constructed for the period 1995-1999 to remove any potential contemporaneous feedback21. The 
second is the 3-digit SIC industry Lerner index of competition by country, which is (1 – 
profits/sales), calculated as the average across the entire firm level database (excluding each firm 
itself)22. Again, this is constructed for the period 1995-1999 to remove any potential 
contemporaneous feedback. The third measure of competition is the survey question on the number 
                                                 
21 Melitz (2003) and others have suggested this measure of trade exposure should truncate the lower part of the 
productivity distribution. We have also looked at (Imports+Exports)/Production as an alternative indicator of trade 
exposure with similar results to those reported here. 
22 Note that in constructing this we draw on firms in the population database, not just those in the survey. 
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of competitors a firm faces (see Appendix A2), valued 0 for “no competitors”, 1 for “less than 5 
competitors”, and 2 for “5 or more competitors”23.  
 
IV. RESULTS 
k at is whether our key measure of WLB is correlated with features of the firm 
.A Validating our Work-Life Balance Measure 
 perceptions indicator on a number of variables 
ates WLB with average hours worked per week in the firm. An extra 10 
ith a 
The first thing we loo
that should “objectively” reflect better WLB. If this did not turn out to be true, we would suspect 
that the WLB measure was not really reflecting the actual events on the ground, but rather some 
other missing firm-specific characteristic. 
 
IV
Table 2 examines this issue by regressing the WLB
that we would expect to be associated with better work-life balance. Reassuringly we find that all the 
associations are sensible. 
Column (1) simply correl
hours a week worked is associated with a 12% lower WLB score (about 0.4 lower than the mean of 
3.21). This association is significant at the 5% level. In the second column, we control for country 
dummies, the size of the firm, whether the firm is publicly listed and the age of the firm. Large firms 
appear to have significantly better WLB than smaller firms. With the exception of the country 
dummies, all other variables are insignificant. The coefficient on managerial hours stays essentially 
the same. The next column splits hours into average hours worked by managers and average hours 
worked by non-managers. Both variables are negatively related to WLB at the 10% significance 
level or higher, suggesting WLB is related to the hours worked by both workers and managers. 
Column (4) includes the number of days’ holiday per year – more holidays are associated w
higher WLB score. Similarly, firms that are flexible and allow some working from home (column 
(5)), job switching (column (6)) and job sharing (column (7)) also have higher reported WLB. The 
next two columns show that firms who have “family-friendly” policies with regard to allowing 
flexibility for employees to take time off for children (column (8))24 or offer childcare subsidies 
                                                 
23 This question has been used by inter alia Nickell (1996) and Stewart (1990).  
24 This variable was in response to the question “If an employee needed to take a day off at short notice  
”, and was ordered conceptually as: 1 = 
to the scores as 
due to child-care problems or their child was sick how they generally do this?
Not allowed; 2 = Allowed but unpaid; and 3 = Allowed and paid. Hence, we allocated the responses 
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(column (9)) also score more highly on WLB. All of these correlations are significant and consistent 
with the notion that the WLB measure is picking up something real about the policies in the firm.  
The final column includes the proportion of female managers in the regression. Firms who have a 
greater proportion of female managers are also more likely to report a higher WLB. This correlation 
is specifically related to the proportion of female managers, not females in the workplace as a whole. 
(the share of females in non-managerial positions is not correlated with WLB). This result could be 
due to a combination of factors: (i) more female managers will mean greater bargaining power for 
issues particularly important to women such as the childcare related parts of WLB, (ii) women are 
able to advance to more senior roles in firms with better WLB which support their home life and/or 
(iii) female managers are particularly attracted to better WLB firms. 
 
Across all these specifications in Table 2 it is also worth noting that firm size is always significantly 
and positively correlated with work-life balance. This suggests large firms typically treat their 
employees better.25  
 
IV.B Work-Life Balance and Management 
Table 3 examines the correlation between WLB and our composite measure of good management 
described in the previous section. In previous work (e.g. Bloom et al, 2005) we have found this a 
reliable metric of the overall degree of managerial quality in the firm and the management score is 
strongly correlated with superior firm performance. Is it the case that firms who adopt these better 
“Anglo-Saxon” practices do so at the expense of employees’ WLB? The evidence in Table 3 
suggests not.
                                                                                                                                                                   
follows: A score of 1 for “Not Allowed” or “Never been asked”; a score of 2 for “Take as leave without pay” or “Take 
time off but make it up later” and a score of 3 for “Take as annual leave” or “Take as sick leave”. 
25 Directly including a multi-national dummy, we observe a positive but insignificant coefficient. 
 16
TABLE 2: OUR WORK-LIFE BALANCE INDICATOR IS CORRELATED WITH 
FEATURES OF THE FIRM IN THE EXPECTED WAY 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent 
variable 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
           
Hours (all 
Employees) 
-0.038** 
(0.012) 
-0.037** 
(0.012)         
Hours 
(Managers)   
-0.016** 
(0.008)        
Hours (Non-
managers)   
-0.023* 
(0.013) 
       
Days 
Holiday p.a.     
0.026** 
(0.007) 
      
Working 
from Home 
allowed 
    0.286** (0.098)      
Job 
Switching 
allowed 
     0.185* (0.094)     
Job Sharing 
allowed       
0.369** 
(0.151)    
Childcare 
flexibility        
0.321** 
(0.094)   
Childcare 
subsidy         
0.265** 
(0.106) 
 
Proportion 
of Female 
managers 
         
0.005** 
(0.002) 
Firm size,ln 
(employees)  
0.104*** 
(0.036) 
0.113*** 
(0.037) 
0.113***
(0.038) 
0.097***
(0.038) 
0.079***
(0.037) 
0.087*** 
(0.038) 
0.109*** 
(0.036) 
0.084***
(0.038) 
0.111***
(0.037) 
           
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 
            
 
NOTES: In all columns, standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates and allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10%level. Controls include country dummies, a 
dummy for public listing and the ln(age) of the firm. 
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In the first column of Table 3, we regress WLB on the average management score and nothing else. 
There is a strong positive and significant correlation between the two indices. Including the usual 
vector of control variables in the second column (size, age, four country dummies and listing status) 
does little to change this. The third column includes a more rigorous set of controls – the share of 
female managers and whether the firm is a subsidiary of a US or non-US multinational (these 
variables were insignificant). We also include a skills measure – the proportion of workers with 
degrees – which is significant at the 5% level. Hence, firms with more skilled workers also tend to 
have better work-life balance practices. 
 
We then disaggregate our management measure into four components – operations, monitoring, 
targets and people management (incentives). Interestingly, the WLB measure is correlated with each 
of these when entered individually into the regression (columns (4) through (6)). When all four are 
included simultaneously in the regression it is the people management score that dominates, as we 
would expect given the focus of the WLB measure on people and lifestyle. 
In Table 3, the final column further disaggregates the people management score into its five 
components. Three of these are “carrots” (related to good practices on promotion, recruiting and 
retaining talent) and two of these are “sticks” (dealing with the consequences of problems in 
appraisals by disciplining and in the final instance, firing). Unsurprisingly, the carrots are associated 
with a better WLB than the sticks. 
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TABLE 3: WORK-LIFE BALANCE IS ASSOCIATED WITH GOOD MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variable 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
Work-
life 
Balance 
          
Management 
Score 
0.192** 
(0.056) 
0.200** 
(0.062) 
0.175** 
(0.065)       
Type of 
management:          
Operations    0.094* (0.046)    
-0.014 
(0.070)  
Monitoring     0.114** (0.051)   
-0.062 
(0.092)  
Targets      0.093* (0.049)  
-0.074 
(0.079)  
People       0.263** (0.064) 
0.382** 
(0.093)  
Type of people 
management:          
Developing 
talent         
0.114** 
(0.055) 
Employee value 
proposition         
0.140** 
(0.051) 
Performance 
based promotion         
0.042 
(0.053) 
Consequence 
management         
-0.028 
(0.045) 
Firing bad 
performers         
-0.073 
(0.050) 
Ln(% employees 
with degrees)   
0.118**
(0.057)       
 
Ln(firm size)  
0.067 
(0.041) 
0.080* 
(0.041) 
      
          
Basic Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Full controls No No Yes No No No No No No 
Noise controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
NOTES: In all columns, standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates and allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10%level. Basic Controls include country 
dummies, size, whether the firm is publicly listed and the ln(age) of the firm. Full controls include % female managers, US and non-
US multinational status. Noise controls include a full set of interviewer dummies, seniority of the interviewee, a full set of day of the 
week controls, time local and time in the UK controls, interviewee’s tenure in post, the number of countries he/she has worked in, 
their gender, and the duration of the interview. 
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IV.C Competition, Work-life Balance and Management 
Having established the correlations of WLB with several factors, we now turn to the key hypotheses 
on product market competition and productivity. Our previous research has found that tougher 
product market competition is an important driver of higher productivity26 and at least part of this 
seems to work through improving management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2005). This is 
one reason for supporting moves towards deregulation and liberalisation as it improves firm 
performance. Nevertheless, does “neo-libéralisme sauvage” also destroy work-life balance and make 
workers miserable? 
Table 4 examines this in detail. The first three columns report what we have shown elsewhere. 
Whether we measure competition by the degree of openness to imports (column (1)), the degree of 
“excess profit” in the industry (column (2)) or simply the number of competitors (column (3)), 
tougher competition appears to improve the average management score in the firm. The simplest 
interpretation of this association is Darwinian: tougher competition drives out the tail of badly 
managed companies27. 
The final three columns of the table present new results looking at the impact of product market 
competition on work-life balance. For each of the three measures of competition there appears to be 
a positive association with WLB, i.e. more competition is associated with better WLB. However, the 
standard errors are very large and none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero. We 
conclude that although competition seems to improve management, it does not seem to reduce WLB. 
                                                 
26 On the relationship between productivity and competition see also inter alia Nickell (1996), Syverson (2004a,b), 
Blundell et al (1999) and Aghion et al (2005). 
27 There are alternative stories, of course. Tougher competition may give an added incentive for managers to work 
harder. However, we find no empirical evidence that employees (managers or workers) work longer hours in more 
competitive industries.  
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TABLE 4: WORK-LIFE BALANCE IS UNRELATED TO COMPETITION 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable Management z-score 
Management 
z-score 
Management 
z-score 
WLB (Work-
life Balance) 
WLB (Work-
life Balance) 
WLB (Work-
life Balance) 
       
Import penetration 
(5-year lagged) 
0.157** 
(0.078) 
  0.092 
(0.071)  
 
Lerner index of 
competition 
(5-year lagged) 
 1.318** 
(0.588) 
  0.871 
(0.829) 
 
Number of 
competitors  
  0.144** 
(0.045) 
 
 
0.017 
(0.075) 
       
Firms 726 732 732 528 524 530 
Country controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Full controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by country * industry pair); single cross-section. ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, 
*=significant at the 10%level. “Country controls” includes four country dummies. “Full controls” includes ln(firm size), 
ln(firm age), a dummy for being listed, the share of workforce with degrees, the share of workforce with MBAs, a 
dummy for being consolidated “Import Penetration” = ln(Import/Production) in every country industry pair. Average 
over 1995-1999 used. “Lerner index of competition” constructed, as in Aghion et al. (2005), as the mean of (1 - 
profit/sales) in the entire database (excluding the firm itself) for every country industry pair. “Number of competitors” 
constructed from the response to the survey question on number of competitors, and is coded as 0 for “none” (1% of 
responses), 1 for “less than 5” (51% of responses), and 2 for “5 or more” (48% of responses). Columns (4) through (6) 
include, and the “noise controls of column (2) in Table A2 (17 interviewer dummies, the seniority, gender, tenure and 
number of countries worked in of the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the 
time of the day the interview was conducted, the duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the 
information as coded by the interviewer); 
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We also estimated the relationship between competition and the WLB-related measures examined in 
section IV.D – average hours worked per week, days holidays per year, working from home 
flexibility, job switching flexibility, flexibility for childcare time off and childcare subsidies – and 
found no significant relationships. In fact, these coefficients were positive in 12 of the 18 
regressions, although typically with large standard-errors.28 So we confirm the earlier conclusion 
that although competition seems to improve management, it does not seem to reduce any WLB 
practices. 
In summary, while higher competition appears to increase management practices by removing the 
least productive firms from the market it does not seem to affect WLB. This is presumably because – 
as we show in the next section – WLB practices and productivity are unrelated, so that the 
Darwinian selection effects of competition have no bearing on typical WLB practices. 
 
IV.D Productivity, Work-life Balance and Management 
The final issue is the association of WLB with productivity. The win-win theory that is often 
trumpeted is that better WLB will lead to higher productivity. The Chirac hypothesis is that WLB 
and productivity represent a trade-off, with US firms appearing to be doing well only because they 
have sacrificed the WLB of their workers. 
We address these issues in Table 5 showing the results from simple production functions where the 
dependent variable is the log of real sales. Because we control for the factor inputs (labour, capital 
and materials) the coefficient on WLB should be interpreted as the “effect” on (or more accurately, 
conditional correlation of WLB with) Total Factor Productivity (TFP). We must always remember 
the caveat that these are associations and we cannot simply infer the causal effect of WLB from 
these regressions.  
  
                                                 
28 We estimated the Table 4 columns 1,2 and 3 specifications exchanging the WLB measure for: (i) average hours 
worked per week, (ii) days holidays per year, (iii) working from home flexibility, (iv) job switching flexibility, (v) 
flexibility for childcare time off and (vi) childcare subsidies. Results available on request for the authors. 
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TABLE 5: WORK-LIFE BALANCE IS UNRELATED TO PRODUCTIVITY 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Countries All All All 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable 
Ln (Y) it 
sales
Ln (Y) it 
sales
Ln (Y) it 
sales
Work-life balance 
0.031** 
(0.015) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.015) 
Management z-score 
 
 
0.053** 
(0.021) 
ln (L) it 
labour
0.491** 
(0.030) 
0.556** 
(0.062) 
0.541** 
(0.061) 
Ln(K) it 
capital
0.134** 
(0.027) 
0.125** 
(0.043) 
0.120** 
(0.043) 
ln (Materials) it, 
materials
0.378** 
(0.032) 
0.337** 
(0.047) 
0.344** 
(0.046) 
    
Basic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Full controls No Yes Yes 
Firms 491 491 491 
    
 
NOTES: In all columns, standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates and allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10%level. Basic controls include country and 
industry dummies, log (firm age), public listing and consolidated dummy. Full control s include % of workforce with degrees, % of 
employees with MBAs, % of employees female, US multinational dummy, non-US multinational dummy. It also includes a full set of 
country specific capital, materials and labour controls to allow these to vary across countries in reflection of potentially different 
accounting definitions of these factors. The coefficients for these factors with the Full Controls report the values for the UK that is the 
baseline country. 
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Column (1) of Table 5 reports the first specification that also includes country and industry dummies 
and basic firm characteristic controls. The association of WLB and productivity is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient falls by about a third when we condition on a wider set of 
controls (skills, multinationals, listing, age) in the next column and becomes insignificant. In column 
(3), we also include the composite management score. As in previous work, this is positive and 
highly significant. Conditional on this management score the WLB balance coefficient falls by a 
further quarter to a value of less than half of its raw correlation.  
This suggests that the significant association of WLB with productivity is spurious and arises 
because WLB is correlated with omitted variables – such as good management quality. Firms with 
better management practices will tend to have both higher productivity and better work-life balance. 
This gives rise (in column (1)) to the mistaken impression that better WLB causes higher 
productivity. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
As unemployment in the UK has fallen to historically low levels, policy and media attention has 
focused more on the quality of work rather than just the quantity of jobs. This focus has sharpened 
as female workforce participation has steadily increased and issues of work-life balance (WLB) and 
family-friendly policies have risen up on the political agenda. Many of these debates have focused 
around the important issue of equity at work. However, what are the economic effects of changing 
WLB practices and how do they relate to firm productivity and management more generally?  
  
To dig deeper into this puzzle we crudely characterised two opposing views on WLB-enhancing 
practices – the “Chirac” theory and the “win-win” theory. The Chirac theory argues that Anglo-
Saxon “neo-liberalism” encapsulated by tougher product market competition and globalisation has 
undesirable consequences. Although these forces will raise productivity, they come at the expense of 
misery for workers in the form of poor WLB (long hours, job insecurity, intense and unsatisfying 
work). The win-win theory in contrast argues that better WLB will improve productivity; and 
employers are making the mistake of failing to treat their workers as assets by implementing better 
WLB policies. The present government sides more with the win-win view and has introduced more 
generous provisions for maternity and paternity leave, for example.  
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In our study, we find evidence for a hybrid view between these two polar extremes. Using originally 
collected data on WLB measures and management practices on over 700 firms in Europe and the 
US, we first find that the Chirac hypothesis is not supported by the data – there is a positive 
association between overall management quality and work-life balance. That is, better-managed 
firms provide a better WLB for their employees. Similarly, the hypothesis that competition and 
globalisation are bad for workers’ WLB also receives little support: There is no relationship between 
competition and work-life balance. Also, larger firms – which are typically more globalised – 
typically have better WLB practices. 
  
However, the win-win view that WLB will improve productivity also received little empirical 
support: there is no systematic relationship between productivity and WLB once good management 
is accounted for. 
  
We consequently find some support for the third “hybrid” theory where “good management” and 
work-life balance are neither straightforward substitutes for each other nor strictly complementary. 
If firms do introduce better WLB this neither penalises them in terms of productivity (as suggested 
by the Chirac theory), nor does it significantly reward them (as claimed by the win-win view). On 
average, they are neutral.  
 
This may suggest that improving WLB is socially desirable – workers obviously like it and firm 
productivity does not inordinately suffer. Our results do not, however, give a green light for policy-
makers to regulate more WLB. Even if productivity does not fall, WLB is costly to implement and 
maintain, and may result in significantly lower profitability. Any proposed changes to WLB policies 
need to weigh up these financial burdens on firms.  
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APPENDIX A1: MANAGEMENT PRACTICE INTERVIEW GUIDE AND EXAMPLE RESPONSES  
 
Any score from 1 to 5 can be given, but the scoring guide and examples are only provided for scores of 1, 3 and 5. Multiple questions are 
used for each dimension to improve scoring accuracy. 
 
(1) Modern manufacturing, introduction 
  a) Can you describe the production process for me? 
b) What kinds of lean (modern) manufacturing processes have you introduced? Can you give me specific examples? 
c) How do you manage inventory levels? What is done to balance the line? What is the Takt time of your manufacturing processes? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
  
   
Scoring grid: Other than JIT delivery from suppliers few 
modern manufacturing techniques have 
been introduced, (or have been introduced 
in an ad-hoc manner) 
 
Some aspects of modern manufacturing 
techniques have been introduced, through 
informal/isolated change programs 
All major aspects of modern manufacturing have been 
introduced (Just-in-time, autonomation, flexible 
manpower, support systems, attitudes and behaviour) in 
a formal way 
Examples: A UK firm orders in bulk and stores the 
material on average 6 months before use. 
The business focuses on quality and not 
reduction of lead-time or costs. Absolutely 
no modern manufacturing techniques had 
been introduced.  
A supplier to the army is undergoing a full 
lean transformation. For 20 years, the 
company was a specialty supplier to the 
army, but now they have had to identify 
other competencies forcing them to compete 
with lean manufacturers. They have begun 
adopting specific lean techniques and plan to 
use full lean by the end of next year. 
A US firm has formally introduced all major elements of 
modern production. It reconfigured the factory floor 
based on value stream mapping and 5-S principles, broke 
production into cells, eliminated stockrooms, 
implemented Kanban, and adopted Takt time analyses to 
organize workflow. 
(2) Modern manufacturing, rationale 
  a) Can you take through the rationale to introduce these processes? 
b) What factors led to the adoption of these lean (modern) management practices? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
  Scoring grid: Modern manufacturing techniques were 
introduced because others were using them. 
Modern manufacturing techniques were 
introduced to reduce costs 
Modern manufacturing techniques were introduced to 
enable us to meet our business objectives (including 
costs) 
  Examples: A German firm introduced modern 
techniques because all its competitors were 
using these techniques. The business 
decision had been taken to imitate the 
competition.  
A French firm introduced modern 
manufacturing methods primarily to reduce 
costs. 
A US firm implemented lean techniques because the 
COO had worked with them before and knew that they 
would enable the business to reduce costs, competing 
with cheaper imports through improved quality, flexible 
production, greater innovation and JIT delivery. 
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(3) Process problem documentation 
  a) How would you go about improving the manufacturing process itself? 
b) How do problems typically get exposed and fixed? 
c) Talk me through the process for a recent problem. 
d) Do the staff ever suggest process improvements? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
  
  
Scoring grid: No, process improvements are made when 
problems occur. 
Improvements are made in one week 
workshops involving all staff, to improve 
performance in their area of the plant 
Exposing problems in a structured way is integral to 
individuals’ responsibilities and resolution occurs as a 
part of normal business processes rather than by 
extraordinary effort/teams 
 
Examples: A US firm has no formal or informal 
mechanism in place for either process 
documentation or improvement. The 
manager admitted that production takes 
place in an environment where nothing has 
been done to encourage or support process 
innovation. 
A US firm takes suggestions via an 
anonymous box, they then review these each 
week in their section meeting and decide any 
that they would like to proceed with. 
The employees of a German firm constantly analyse the 
production process as part of their normal duty. They 
film critical production steps to analyse areas more 
thoroughly. Every problem is registered in a special 
database that monitors critical processes and each issue 
must be reviewed and signed off by a manager. 
(4) Performance tracking 
  a) Tell me how you track production performance? 
b) What kind of KPI’s would you use for performance tracking? How frequently are these measured? Who gets to see this KPI data? 
c) If I were to walk through your factory could I tell how you were doing against your KPI’s? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Measures tracked do not indicate directly if 
overall business objectives are being met. 
Tracking is an ad-hoc process (certain 
processes aren’t tracked at all) 
 
Most key performance indicators are tracked 
formally. Tracking is overseen by senior 
management.  
Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, 
both formally and informally, to all staff using a range of 
visual management tools. 
 Examples: A manager of a US firm tracks a range of 
measures when he does not think that 
output is sufficient. He last requested these 
reports about 8 months ago and had them 
printed for a week until output increased 
again. 
At a US firm every product is bar-coded and 
performance indicators are tracked 
throughout the production process; however, 
this information is not communicated to 
workers 
A US firm has screens in view of every line. These 
screens are used to display progress to daily target and 
other performance indicators. The manager meets with 
the shop floor every morning to discuss the day past and 
the one ahead and uses monthly company meetings to 
present a larger view of the goals to date and strategic 
direction of the business to employees. He even stamps 
napkins with key performance achievements to ensure 
everyone is aware of a target that has been hit. 
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(5) Performance review 
  a) How do you review your KPI’s? 
b) Tell me about a recent meeting 
c) Who is involved in these meetings? Who gets to see the results of this review? 
d) What are the typical next steps after a meeting? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Performance is reviewed infrequently or in 
an un-meaningful way e.g. only success or 
failure is noted. 
Performance is reviewed periodically with 
successes and failures identified. Results are 
communicated to senior management. No 
clear follow-up plan is adopted. 
 
Performance is continually reviewed, based on indicators 
tracked. All aspects are followed up ensure continuous 
improvement. Results are communicated to all staff 
 Examples: A manager of a US firm relies heavily on 
his gut feel of the business. He will review 
costs when he thinks there is too much or 
too little in the stores. He admits he is busy 
so reviews are infrequent. He also 
mentioned staffs feel like he is going on a 
hunt to find a problem, so he has now made 
a point of highlighting anything good. 
A UK firm uses daily production meetings to 
compare performance to plan. However, 
clear action plans are infrequently developed 
based on these production results. 
A French firm tracks all performance numbers real time 
(amount, quality etc). These numbers are continuously 
matched to the plan on a shift-by-shift basis. Every 
employee can access these figures on workstations on 
the shop floor. If scheduled numbers are not met, action 
for improvement is taken immediately. 
(6) Performance dialogue 
  a) How are these meetings structured? Tell me about your most recent meeting. 
b) During these meeting do you find that you generally have enough data? 
c) How useful do you find problem solving meetings? 
d) What type of feedback occurs in these meetings? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: The right data or information for a 
constructive discussion is often not present 
or conversations overly focus on data that is 
not meaningful. Clear agenda is not known 
and purpose is not stated explicitly 
Review conversations are held with the 
appropriate data and information present. 
Objectives of meetings are clear to all 
participating and a clear agenda is present. 
Conversations do not, as a matter of course, 
drive to the root causes of the problems. 
 
Regular review/performance conversations focus on 
problem solving and addressing root causes. Purpose, 
agenda and follow-up steps are clear to all. Meetings are 
an opportunity for constructive feedback and coaching. 
 Examples: A US firm does not conduct staff reviews. 
It was just “not the philosophy of the 
company” to do that. The company was 
very successful during the last decade and 
therefore did not feel the need to review 
their performance.  
A UK firm focuses on key areas to discuss 
each week. This ensures they receive 
consistent management attention and 
everyone comes prepared. However, 
meetings are more of an opportunity for 
everyone to stay abreast of current issues 
rather than problem solve. 
A German firm meets weekly to discuss performance 
with workers and management. Participants come from 
all departments (shop floor, sales, R&D, procurement 
etc.) to discuss the previous week performance and to 
identify areas to improve. They focus on the cause of 
problems and agree topics to be followed up the next 
week, allocating all tasks to individual participants. 
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(7) Consequence management   
  a) What happens if there is a part of the business (or a manager) who isn’t achieving agreed upon results? Can you give me a recent example? 
b) What kind of consequences would follow such an action? 
c) Are there are any parts of the business (or managers) that seem to repeatedly fail to carry out agreed actions? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Failure to achieve agreed objectives does 
not carry any consequences 
Failure to achieve agreed results is tolerated 
for a period before action is taken. 
A failure to achieve agreed targets drives retraining in 
identified areas of weakness or moving individuals to 
where their skills are appropriate 
 
 Examples: At a French firm no action is taken when 
objectives aren’t achieved. The President 
personally intervenes to warn employees 
but no stricter action is taken. Cutting 
payroll or making people redundant 
because of a lack of performance is very 
rarely done.  
Management of a US firm reviews 
performance quarterly. That is the earliest 
they can react to any underperformance. 
They increase pressure on the employees if 
targets are not met. 
A German firm takes action as soon as a weakness is 
identified. They have even employed a psychologist to 
improve behaviour within a difficult group. People 
receive ongoing training to improve performance. If this 
doesn’t help they move them in other departments or 
even fire individuals if they repeatedly fail to meet 
agreed targets  
(8) Target balance   
  a) What types of targets are set for the company? What are the goals for your plant? 
b) Tell me about the financial and non-financial goals? 
c) What do CHQ (or their appropriate manager) emphasize to you? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals are exclusively financial or 
operational 
Goals include non-financial targets, which 
form part of the performance appraisal of top 
management only (they are not reinforced 
throughout the rest of organization) 
Goals are a balance of financial and non-financial 
targets. Senior managers believe the non-financial 
targets are often more inspiring and challenging than 
financials alone. 
 
 Examples: At a UK firm performance targets are 
exclusively operational. Specifically 
volume is the only meaningful objective for 
managers, with no targeting of quality, 
flexibility or waste. 
For French firm strategic goals are very 
important. They focus on market share and 
try to hold their position in technology 
leadership. However, workers on the shop 
floor are not aware of those targets. 
A US firm gives everyone a mix of operational and 
financial targets. They communicate financial targets to 
the shop floor in a way they found effective – for 
example telling workers they pack boxes to pay the 
overheads until lunchtime and after lunch it is all profit 
for the business. If they are having a good day the boards 
immediately adjust and play the “profit jingle” to let the 
shop floor know that they are now working for profit. 
Everyone cheers when the jingle is played. 
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(9) Target interconnection   
  a) What is the motivation behind your goals? 
b) How are these goals cascaded down to the individual workers? 
c) What are the goals of the top management team (do they even know what they are!)? 
d) How are your targets linked to company performance and their goals? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
  
  
 
Scoring grid: Goals are based purely on accounting 
figures (with no clear connection to 
shareholder value) 
Corporate goals are based on shareholder 
value but are not clearly communicated 
down to individuals 
 
 
Corporate goals focus on shareholder value. They 
increase in specificity as they cascade through business 
units ultimately defining individual performance 
expectations. 
Examples: A family owned firm in France is only 
concerned about the net income for the 
year. They try to maximize income every 
year without focusing on any long term 
consequences. 
A US firm bases its strategic corporate goals 
on enhancing shareholder value, but does not 
clearly communicate this to workers. 
Departments and individuals have little 
understanding of their connection to 
profitability or value with many areas 
labelled as “cost-centres” with an objective 
to cost-cut despite potentially 
disproportionately large negative impact on 
the other departments they serve. 
 
For a US firm strategic planning begins with a bottom up 
approach that is then compared with the top down aims. 
Multifunctional teams meet every 6 months to track and 
plan deliverables for each area. This is then presented to 
the area head that then agrees or refines it and then 
communicates it down to his lowest level. Everyone has 
to know exactly how they contribute to the overall goals 
or else they won’t understand how important the 10 
hours they spend at work every day is to the business.  
(10) Target time horizon 
  a) What kind of time scale are you looking at with your targets? 
b) Which goals receive the most emphasis? 
c) How are long term goals linked to short term goals? 
d) Could you meet all your short-run goals but miss your long-run goals? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Top management's main focus is on short 
term targets 
There are short and long-term goals for all 
levels of the organization. As they are set 
independently, they are not necessarily 
linked to each other 
 
Long term goals are translated into specific short term 
targets so that short term targets become a "staircase" to 
reach long term goals 
 Examples: A UK firm has had several years of 
ongoing senior management changes – 
therefore senior managers are only focusing 
on how the company is doing this month 
versus the next, believing that long-term 
targets will take care of themselves. 
A US firm has both long and short-term 
goals. The long-term goals are known by the 
senior managers and the short-term goals are 
the remit of the operational managers. 
Operations managers only occasionally see 
the longer-term goals so are often unsure 
how they link with the short term goals. 
A UK firm translates all their goals – even their 5-year 
strategic goals - into short-term goals so they can track 
their performance to them. They believe that it is only 
when you make someone accountable for delivery within 
a sensible timeframe that a long-term objective will be 
met. They think it is more interesting for employees to 
have a mix of immediate and longer-term goals. 
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(11) Targets are stretching   
  a) How tough are your targets? Do you feel pushed by them? 
b) On average, how often would you say that you meet your targets? 
c) Are there any targets which are obviously too easy (will always be met) or too hard (will never be met)? 
d) Do you feel that on targets that all groups receive the same degree of difficulty? Do some groups get easy targets? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Goals are either too easy or impossible to 
achieve; managers provide low estimates to 
ensure easy goals 
In most areas, top management pushes for 
aggressive goals based on solid economic 
rationale. There are a few "sacred cows" that 
are not held to the same rigorous standard 
 
Goals are genuinely demanding for all divisions. They 
are grounded in solid, solid economic rationale 
 Examples: A French firm uses easy targets to improve 
staff morale and encourage people. They 
find it difficult to set harder goals because 
people just give up and managers refuse to 
work people harder. 
A chemicals firm has 2 divisions, producing 
special chemicals for very different markets 
(military, civil). Easier levels of targets are 
requested from the founding and more 
prestigious military division.  
 
A manager of a UK firm insisted that he has to set 
aggressive and demanding goals for everyone – even 
security. If they hit all their targets he worries he has not 
stretched them enough. Each KPI is linked to the overall 
business plan. 
(12) Performance clarity  
  a) What are your targets (i.e. do they know them exactly)? Tell me about them in full. 
b) Does everyone know their targets? Does anyone complain that the targets are too complex? 
c) How do people know about their own performance compared to other people’s performance? 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
 Scoring grid: Performance measures are complex and not 
clearly understood. Individual performance 
is not made public 
Performance measures are well defined and 
communicated; performance is public in all 
levels but comparisons are discouraged 
Performance measures are well defined, strongly 
communicated and reinforced at all reviews; 
performance and rankings are made public to induce 
competition 
 
 Examples: A German firm measures performance per 
employee based on differential weighting 
across 12 factors, each with its own 
measurement formulas (e.g. Individual 
versus average of the team, increase on 
prior performance, thresholds etc.). 
Employees complain the formula is too 
complex to understand, and even the plant 
manager could not remember all the details. 
A French firm does not encourage simple 
individual performance measures as unions 
pressure them to avoid this. However, charts 
display the actual overall production process 
against the plan for teams on regular basis. 
At a US firm self-directed teams set and monitor their 
own goals. These goals and their subsequent outcomes 
are posted throughout the company, encouraging 
competition in both target setting and achievement. 
Individual members know where they are ranked which 
is communicated personally to them bi-annually. 
Quarterly company meetings seek to review performance 
and align targets. 
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(13) Managing human capital   
  a) Do senior managers discuss attracting and developing talented people? 
b) Do senior managers get any rewards for bringing in and keeping talented people in the company? 
c) Can you tell me about the talented people you have developed within your team? Did you get any rewards for this? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
  
  
 
Scoring grid: Senior management do not communicate 
that attracting, retaining and developing 
talent throughout the organization is a top 
priority 
Senior management believe and 
communicate that having top talent 
throughout the organization is a key way to 
win 
 
Senior managers are evaluated and held accountable on 
the strength of the talent pool they actively build 
Examples: A US firm does not actively train or 
develop its employees, and does not 
conduct performance appraisals or 
employee reviews. People are seen as a 
secondary input to the production. 
A US firm strives to attract and retain talent 
throughout the organization, but does not 
hold managers individually accountable for 
the talent pool they build. The company 
actively cross-trains employees for 
development and challenges them through 
exposure to a variety of technologies. 
 
A UK firm benchmarks human resources practices at 
leading firms. A cross-functional HR excellence 
committee develops policies and strategies to achieve 
company goals. Bi-monthly directors’ meetings seek to 
identify training and development opportunities for 
talented performers. 
(14) Rewarding high-performance 
  a) How does you appraisal system work? Tell me about the most recent round? 
b) How does the bonus system work? 
c) Are there any non-financial rewards for top-performers? 
d) How does your reward system compare to your competitors? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
  
  
Scoring grid: People within our firm are rewarded 
equally irrespective of performance level 
Our company has an evaluation system for 
the awarding of performance related rewards 
We strive to outperform the competitors by providing 
ambitious stretch targets with clear performance related 
accountability and rewards 
 
Examples: An East Germany firm pays its people 
equally and regardless of performance. The 
management said to us “there are no 
incentives to perform well in our 
company”. Even the management is paid an 
hourly wage, with no bonus pay. 
A German firm has an awards system based 
on three components: the individual’s 
performance, shift performance, and overall 
company performance.  
A US firm sets ambitious targets, rewarded through a 
combination of bonuses linked to performance, team 
lunches cooked by management, family picnics, movie 
passes and dinner vouchers at nice local restaurants. 
They also motivate staff to try by giving awards for 
perfect attendance, best suggestion etc. 
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(15) Removing poor performers   
  a) If you had a worker who could not do his job what would you do? Could you give me a recent example? 
b) How long would underperformance be tolerated? 
c) Do you find any workers who lead a sort of charmed life? Do some individuals always just manage to avoid being fixed/fired? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
  
  
  
Scoring grid: Poor performers are rarely removed from 
their positions  
Suspected poor performers stay in a position 
for a few years before action is taken 
We move poor performers out of the company or to less 
critical roles as soon as a weakness is identified 
 
Examples: A French firm had a supervisor who was 
regularly drinking alcohol at work but no 
action was taken to help him or move him. 
In fact no employee had ever been laid off 
in the factory. According to the plant 
manager HR “kicked up a real fuss” 
whenever management wanted to get rid of 
employees, and told managers their job was 
production not personnel. 
For a German firm it is very hard to remove 
poor performers. The management has to 
prove at least three times that an individual 
underperformed before they can take serious 
action.  
At a US firm, the manager fired four people during last 
couple of months due to underperformance. They 
continually investigate why and who are 
underperforming. 
(16) Promoting high performers 
  a) Can you rise up the company rapidly if you are really good? Are there any examples you can think of? 
b) What about poor performers – do they get promoted more slowly? Are there any examples you can think of? 
c) How would you identify and develop (i.e. train) your star performers? 
d) If two people both joined the company 5 years ago and one was much better than the other would he/she be promoted faster? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
  
  
Scoring grid: People are promoted primarily upon the 
basis of tenure  
People are promoted upon the basis of 
performance 
We actively identify, develop and promote our top 
performers  
 
Examples: A UK firm promotes based on an 
individual’s commitment to the company 
measured by experience. Hence, almost all 
employees move up the firm in lock step. 
Management was afraid to change this 
process because it would create bad feeling 
among the older employees who were 
resistant to change. 
A US firm has no formal training program. 
People learn on the job and are promoted 
based on their performance on the job. 
At a UK firm each employee is given a red light (not 
performing), amber light (doing well and meeting 
targets) a green light (consistently meeting targets very 
high performer) and a blue light (high performer capable 
of promotion of up to two levels). Each manager is 
assessed every quarter based on his succession plans and 
development plans for individuals. 
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(17) Attracting human capital  
  a) What makes it distinctive to work at your company as opposed to your competitors? 
b) If you were trying to sell your firm to me how would you do this (get them to try to do this)? 
c) What don’t people like about working in your firm? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
  
  
 
Scoring grid: Our competitors offer stronger reasons for 
talented people to join their companies 
Our value proposition to those joining our 
company is comparable to those offered by 
others in the sector 
 
We provide a unique value proposition to encourage 
talented people join our company above our competitors 
Examples: A manager of a firm in Germany could not 
give an example of a distinctive employee 
proposition and (when pushed) thinks the 
offer is worse than most of its competitors. 
He thought that people working at the firm 
“have drawn the short straw”.  
A US firm seeks to create a value 
proposition comparable to its competitors 
and other local companies by offering 
competitive pay, a family atmosphere, and a 
positive presence in the community.  
A German firm offers a unique value proposition 
through development and training programs, family 
culture in the company and very flexible working hours. 
It also strives to reduce bureaucracy and seeks to push 
decision making down to the lowest levels possible to 
make workers feel empowered and valued. 
 (18) Retaining human capital 
  a) If you had a star performer who wanted to leave what would the company do?  
b) Could you give me an example of a star performers being persuaded to stay after wanting to leave? 
c) Could you give me an example of a star performer who left the company without anyone trying to keep them? 
 
  Score 1 Score 3 Score 5 
  
  
Scoring grid:
 
We do little to try and keep our top talent. We usually work hard to keep our top talent. We do whatever it takes to retain our top talent.  
Examples: A German firm lets people leave the 
company if they want. They do nothing to 
keep those people since they think that it 
would make no sense to try to keep them. 
Management does not think they can keep 
people if they want to work somewhere 
else. The company also will not start salary 
negotiations to retain top talent. 
If management of a French firm feels that 
people want to leave the company, they talk 
to them about the reasons and what the 
company could change to keep them. This 
could be more responsibilities or a better 
outlook for the future. Managers are 
supposed to “take-the-pulse” of employees 
to check satisfaction levels. 
A US firm knows who its top performers are and if any 
of them signal an interest to leave it pulls in senior 
managers and even corporate HQ to talk to them and try 
and persuade them to stay. Occasionally they will 
increase salary rates if necessary and if they feel the 
individual is being underpaid relative to the market. 
Managers have a responsibility to try to keep all 
desirable staff. 
 
 
TABLE A1: QUESTION LEVEL AVERAGES BY COUNTRY 
 
 Question number 
Question 
type 
Average Value by Country 
(US = 100) 
Regression 
Coefficients 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Countries   UK Germany France All 
Modern manufacturing, 
introduction 
1 Operations 90.0 
(3.50) 
86.4 
(3.47) 
101.3 
(3.63) 
  0.017** 
(0.008) 
Modern manufacturing, 
rationale 
2 Operations 92.9 
(3.35) 
101.5 
(3.32) 
101 
(3.47) 
  0.012 
(0.009) 
Process documentation 3 Operations 89.0 
(3.51) 
106.9 
(3.49) 
99 
(3.64) 
  0.030***
(0.009) 
Performance tracking 4 Monitoring 98.3 
(3.19) 
109.5 
(3.17) 
111 
(3.32) 
  0.018** 
(0.009) 
Performance review 5 Monitoring 94.7 
(2.99) 
110.2 
(2.97) 
104 
(3.10)  
 0.016* 
 (0.009) 
Performance dialogue 6 Monitoring 93.0 
(3.19) 
103.3 
(3.11) 
99 
(3.27)  
 0.019** 
(0.009) 
Consequence management 7 Monitoring 96.5 
(3.02) 
108.7 
(3.01) 
94 
(3.13)  
 0.019** 
(0.009) 
Target breadth 8 Targets 91.1 
(3.53) 
93.3 
(3.51) 
94 
(3.66)  
 0.027***
(0.009) 
Target interconnection 9 Targets 93.7 
(3.56) 
97.3 
(3.54) 
78 
(3.68)  
 0.023***
(0.009) 
Target time horizon 10 Targets 91.9 
(3.69) 
98.6 
(3.66) 
92 
(3.83)  
 0.021** 
(0.009) 
Targets are stretching 11 Targets 87.8 
(3.34) 
104.9 
(3.32) 
101 
(3.45)  
 0.015* 
(0.009) 
Performance clarity and 
comparability 
12 Monitoring 93.7 
(3.53) 
80.7 
(3.49) 
83 
(3.65)  
 0.008 
(0.009) 
Managing human capital 13 Targets 89.4 
(3.94) 
99.0 
(3.92) 
89 
(4.08)  
 0.023** 
(0.009) 
Rewarding high 
performance 
14 Incentives 81.6 
(3.42) 
85.2 
(3.42) 
85 
(3.55)  
 0.022** 
(0.010) 
Removing poor performers 15 Incentives 89.4 
(3.04) 
92.5 
(3.02) 
83 
(3.15)  
 0.011 
(0.009) 
Promoting high performers 16 Incentives 90.2 
(2.86) 
104.9 
(2.85) 
92 
(2.97)  
 0.017* 
(0.010) 
Attracting human capital 17 Incentives 90.4 
(2.89) 
95.1 
(2.88) 
85 
(2.99)  
 0.029***
(0.009) 
Retaining human capital 18 Incentives 93.6 
(2.74) 
97.7 
(2.73) 
97 
(2.84)  
 0.007 
(0.009) 
Unweighted Average   91.5 98.7 93.8   0.019 (0.009) 
 
NOTES: In columns (1) to (3) standard deviation of each question’s average response are reported below in brackets. 
Calculated from full sample of 732 firms. Management z-scores used in these calculations. In column (4) results from 18 
OLS estimations following exactly the same specification as column (1) Table (2) except estimated with each individual 
question z-score one-by-one rather than the average management z-score. So every cell in column (4) is from a different 
regression with 5350 observations from 709 firms where: standard errors in parentheses allow for arbitrary heteroskedacity 
and correlation (clustered by firm), and regression includes “full controls” comprising of “firm” controls and “noise controls” 
as detailed in Table 2. *** denotes 1% significance, ** denoted 5% significance and * denotes 1% significance. 
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APPENDIX A2: HUMAN RESOURCES INTERVIEW GUIDE  
Run in parallel as the management survey but targeted at the HR department 
Workforce Characteristics 
Data Field      Breakdown 
Total number of employees (cross check again accounts) (all employees) 
% with university degree     (all employees) 
% with MBA      (all employees) 
Average age of employees    (all employees) 
% of employees      (managerial/non-managerial) 
Average training days per year    (managerial/non-managerial) 
Average hours worked per week (including overtime, excluding breaks) (managerial/non-managerial) 
Average holidays per year    (all employees) 
Average days sick-leave     (all employees) 
% part-time      (managerial/non-managerial) 
% female      (managerial/non-managerial) 
% employees abroad     (all employees) 
% union membership     (all employees) 
Are unions recognized for wages bargaining [yes / no] (all employees) 
Work-life balance: Perceptions 
Question      Response choice (all employees) 
Relative to other companies in your industry [much less / slightly less / the same / slightly 
how much does your company emphasize  more / much more] 
work-life balance?  
Work-Life balance: Policies 
Question      Response choice (managerial/non-managerial) 
If an employee needed to take a day off at short notice [Not allowed / Never Been Asked / Take as leave  
due child-care problems or their child was sick how without pay / Take time off but make it up later 
do they generally do this?    / Take as annual leave / Take as sick leave]  
What entitlements are there to the following  Breakdown  
Working at home in normal working hours?  (managerial/non-managerial) 
Switching from full-time to part-time work?  (managerial/non-managerial) 
Job sharing schemes?     (managerial/non-managerial) 
Financial subsidy to help pay for childcare?  (managerial/non-managerial) 
Organizational Characteristics  
Question      Response choice (all employees) 
Who decides the pace of work?   [exclusively workers / mostly workers / equally /
 mostly managers / exclusively managers] 
Who decides how tasks should be allocated?  [exclusively workers / mostly workers/ equally /
 mostly managers / exclusively managers] 
Do you use self-managing teams? [v. heavily / heavily / moderately / slightly / none] 
Market & firm questions:    Response choice 
# of competitors     [none / less than 5 / 5 or more] 
# hostile take-over bids in last three years   [none / one / more than one ] 
Interviewer’s assessment of the scoring reliability 
1 to 5 scoring system calibrated according to: 
1   = Interviewee did not have enough expertise for interview to be valuable; I have significant doubts about 
most of the management dimensions probed 
3  =  Interviewee had reasonable expertise; on some dimensions I am unsure of scoring 
5  =  Interviewee had good expertise, I am confident that the score reflects management practices in this firm 
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APPENDIX B: DATA 
 
Sampling Frame Construction 
Our sampling frame was based on the Amadeus dataset for Europe (UK, France and 
Germany) and the Compustat dataset for the USA. These all have information on company 
accounting data. We chose firms whose principal industry was in manufacturing and who 
employed (on average between 2000 and 2003) no less than 50 employees and no more than 
10,000 employees. We also removed any clients of the consultancy firm we worked with from 
the sampling frame (33 out of 1,353 firms). 
 
Our sampling frame is reasonably representative of medium sized manufacturing firms. The 
European firms in Amadeus include both private and public firms whereas Compustat only 
includes publicly listed firms. There is no US database with privately listed firms with 
information on sales, labour and capital. Fortunately, there are a much larger proportion of 
firms are listed on the stock exchange in the US than in Europe so we are able to go 
substantially down the size distribution using Compustat. Nevertheless, the US firms in our 
sample are slightly larger than those of the other countries, so we are always careful to control 
for size and public listing in the analyses. Furthermore, when estimating production functions 
we can allow all coefficients to be different on labour, capital, materials and consolidation 
status by country. 
 
Another concern is that we condition on firms where we have information on sales, 
employment and capital. These items are not compulsory for firms below certain size 
thresholds so disclosure is voluntary to some extent for the smaller firms. Luckily, the firms 
in our sampling frame (over 50 workers) are past the threshold for voluntary disclosure (the 
only exception is for capital in Germany).  
 
We achieved a response rate of 54% from the firms that we contacted: a very high success 
rate given the voluntary nature of participation. Respondents were not significantly more 
productive than non-responders. French firms were slightly less likely to respond than firms 
in the other three countries and all respondents were significantly larger than non-
respondents. Apart from these two factors, respondents seemed randomly spread around our 
sampling frame 
 
Firm level data 
Our firm accounting data on sales, employment, capital, profits, shareholder equity, long-term 
debt, market values (for quoted firms) and wages (where available) came from Amadeus 
(France, Germany and the UK) and Compustat (US). For other data fields we did the 
following: 
 
Materials: In France and Germany these are line items in the accounts. In the UK these were 
constructed by deducting the total wage bill from the cost of goods sold. In the US these were 
constructed following the method in Bresnahan et al. (2002). We start with costs of good sold 
(COGS) less depreciation (DP) less labour costs (XLR). For firms who do not report labour 
expenses expenditures we use average wages and benefits at the four-digit industry level 
(Bartelsman, Becker and Gray, 2000, until 1996 and then Census Average Production Worker 
Annual Payroll by 4-digit NAICS code) and multiply this by the firm's reported employment 
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level. This constructed measure is highly correlated at the industry level with materials. 
Obviously there may be problems with this measure of materials (and therefore value added) 
which is why we check robustness to measures without materials. For the US this was 
obtained from Dunn and Bradstreet. 
 
Industry level data 
This comes from the OECD STAN database of industrial production. This is provided at the 
country ISIC Rev. 3 level and is mapped into US SIC (1997) three (which is our common 
industry definition in all four countries). 
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TABLE B1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
    
 All France Germany UK US 
Number of firms, # 732 135 156 151 290 
Work-life balance 3.21 3.44 3.03 3.19 3.22 
Management (mean z score) -0.001 -0.084 0.032 -0.150 0.097 
Employment (mean) 1,984 1,213 1,816 1,735 2,569 
Labour share of output,% 26.4 23.5 28.2 27.2 28.0 
Tobin’s Q 1.71 1.16 1.86 2.01 0.88 
Nominal sales growth rate, % 6.0 5.4 3.8 6.8 7.2 
Age of firm (years) 53.4 38.6 86.8 44.7 48.4 
Listed firm,% 57.2 16.1 41.0 28.5 100 
Multinational subsidiary, % 5.1 8.9 7.1 9.3 0 
Share workforce with degrees, % 21.2 15.5 14.3 14.0 31.0 
Share workforce with an MBA, % 1.36 0.23 0.09 1.28 2.73 
Sickness, days/year 6.80 8.16 8.51 6.21 5.01 
Hours, hours per week 40.7 35.6 38.6 40.8 44.1 
Holidays, days per year  22.7 32.2 29.7 26.9 12.4 
Union density, % 19.9 9.7 41.4 25.3 9.4 
Number of competitors index, 
1=”none”, 2=”a few”, 3=”many” 2.47 2.32 2.35 2.53 2.56 
Lerner index , excluding the firm 
itself 0.055 0.040 0.071 0.040 0.060 
Trade Openness (imports/output) 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.42 0.24 
Childcare flexibility (see Appendix 
A2, 1 is none and 3 is maximum) 2.82 2.75 2.85 2.82 2.85 
Working from home (% that allow 
this) 31.6 23.4 31.7 44.1 30.1 
Switching from full-time to part-
time (% that allow this) 48.0 76.5 61.5 43.7 27.8 
Job-sharing (% that allow this) 10.0 21.0 7.7 15.5 3.6 
Childcare subsidy (% that provide 
this) 16.6 58.5 5.3 3.4 8.4 
      
Notes: Data descriptive calculated on the full sample of 732 firms for which management information is available. 
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TABLE C1: CONTROLS FOR MEASUREMENT ERROR 
 
Dependent variable is Management z-score 
Explanatory Variable Definition Mean  Coefficient (s.e.)  Coefficient (s.e.) 
Male Respondent is male 0.982 -0.277 (0.128) 
-0.298 
(0.127) 
Seniority The position of manager in the 
organization (1 to 5) 3.08 
0.074 
(0.026) 
0.073 
(0.026) 
Tenure in this post Years with current job title 4.88 -0.011 (0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
Tenure in the company Years with the company 11.7 0.002 (0.004)  
Countries Total number of countries 
worked in over last ten years 1.19 
0.085 
(0.048) 
0.092 
(0.043) 
Organizations Total number of organizations 
worked in over last ten years 1.66 
-0.009 
(0.032)  
Manager is foreign Manager was born outside the 
country s/he works 0.032 
-0.048 
(0.142)  
Ever worked in USA The manager has worked in the 
USA at some point 0.425 
0.103 
(0.152)  
Location of manager Manager based on site (rather 
than in corporate HQ) 0.778 
0.011 
(0.063)  
Tuesday Day of the week that interview 
was conducted, (Monday base) 0.181 
0.011 
(0.062) 
0.016 
(0.086) 
Wednesday 
 
Day of the week that interview 
was conducted, (Monday base) 0.280 
0.017 
(0.084) 
0.014 
(0.080) 
Thursday 
 
Day of the week that interview 
was conducted, (Monday base) 0.195 
0.183 
(0.088) 
0.176 
(0.088) 
Friday Day of the week that interview was conducted, (Monday base) 0.165 
0.059 
(0.090) 
0.054 
(0.090) 
Local time for manager The time of the day (24 hour clock) interview conducted 12.45 
-0.023 
(0.010) 
-0.022 
(0.010) 
Days from start of 
project 
Count of days since start of the 
project 39 
0.001 
(0.001)  
Duration of interview The length of the interview with manager (in minutes) 46.0 
0.008 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
Number of contacts Number of telephone calls to arrange the interview 5.73 
0.007 
(0.006)  
Reliability score Interviewer’s subjective ranking of interview reliability (1 to 5) 4.15 
0.326 
(0.034) 
0.327 
(0.033) 
17 Interviewer 
Dummies 
  F(15,699)=3.05 
p-value=0.000 
F(15,699)=3.46 
p-value=0.000 
NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity); 
single cross section; 3 country dummies and 108 three digit industry dummies included in the regression; 732 observations 
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